Broad Interpretation ##HOT##
The problem of contract interpretation presents courts with significant questions about the nature and methodology of judicial intervention into privately arranged affairs. The court often assumes an active role in interpreting the words of a written contract in part because words have more than one meaning or because a contract is incomplete. When a court chooses amongst variable meanings, or interprets contracts to craft limitations on parties' behavior when express limits do not exist, its choice must be then justified using a framework explored in this essay. Traditionally, commentators have advocated one of two general approaches to supply the methodology to govern judicial choices of contract meaning. The first restricts interpretation to the words used in the contract and the other accepts extrinsic evidence about what one or both of the parties to the contract intended that the words would mean or objective evidence of the meaning supplied by context or evidence of how ordinary commercial parties in a trade used the term or behaved in the current contract. This essay argues that it is the wrong to think that courts must make a dichotomous choice always to prefer extrinsic evidence or always to exclude it. Sometimes the appropriate interpretive methodology should explicitly forego extrinsic evidence while at other times it should embrace extrinsic evidence. The choice between the two methodologies should depend upon an assessment in each case about which interpretive methodology is most likely to (1) curb opportunistic behavior; (2) and implement the parties' actual intentions and overall goals, in each case in a cost-effective way and thereby maximize gains from trade.
If an organization does determine that it is processing indirect special category data, it should then ensure there is an appropriate legal basis for that processing under Article 9. If, for example, consent is the basis for the processing of any non-sensitive data elements, the consent language should be explicit and broad enough to cover any indirect special category data or combinations of data as well.
If you need assistance assessing the impact of this broad interpretation on your organization or implementing compliance measures to address it, please contact any member of the Wyrick Robbins privacy team.
This article contributes to the debate on the boundaries of national solidarity systems in the context of the free movement of persons in the EU. It analyses the impact of the ECJ's judgment in Dano on the entitlement to social benefits of economically inactive Union citizens. First, it summarizes the legal discussion so far held on this issue and highlights the questions that remained open after earlier case law of the Court. Next, it explains why a narrow interpretation of the limitation of the principle of equal treatment allowed by the Court is the only acceptable one if legal coherence is to be preserved. It also analyses the consequences of a broad interpretation, arguing that this would undermine the very principle of free movement as a fundamental right, the principle of proportionality as well as the Union's policy objectives of combating poverty and social exclusion.
On the other hand, if the interpretation of the arbitration clause clearly shows that the parties wanted to subject the dispute to arbitration, but there are only differences regarding the conduct of the arbitration proceedings, the utility principle generally applies: in such case, a contractual understanding should be sought that allows the arbitration agreement to remain in existence.
The exercise of the judicial power of the United States often requires that courts construe statutes to apply them in particular cases and controversies. Judicial interpretation of the meaning of a statute is authoritative in the matter before the court. Beyond this, the methodologies and approaches taken by the courts in discerning meaning can help guide legislative drafters, legislators, implementing agencies, and private parties.
Though schools of statutory interpretation vary on what factors should be considered, all approaches start (if not necessarily end) with the language and structure of the statute itself. In this pursuit, the Court follows the principle that a statute be read as a harmonious whole whenever reasonable, with separate parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context.
Still, the meaning of statutory language is not always evident. To help clarify uncertainty, judges have developed various interpretive tools in the form of canons of construction. Canons broadly fall into two types. "Language," or "linguistic," canons are interpretive "rules of thumb" for drawing inferences based on customary usage, grammar, and the like. For example, in considering the meaning of particular words and phrases, language canons call for determining the sense in which terms are being used, that is, whether words or phrases are meant as terms of art with specialized meanings or are meant in the ordinary, "dictionary" sense. Other language canons direct that all words of a statute be given effect if possible, that a term used more than once in a statute ordinarily be given the same meaning throughout, and that specific statutory language ordinarily trumps conflicting general language. "Ordinarily" is a necessary caveat, since any of these "canons" may give way if context points toward a contrary meaning.
Not infrequently the Court stacks the deck, and subordinates the general, linguistic canons of statutory construction, as well as other interpretive principles, to overarching presumptions that favor particular substantive results. When one of these "substantive" canons applies, the Court frequently requires a "clear statement" of congressional intent to negate it. A commonly invoked "substantive" canon is that Congress does not intend to change judge-made law. Other substantive canons disfavor preemption of state law and abrogation of state immunity from suit in federal court. As another example, Congress must strongly signal an intent to the courts if it wishes to apply a statute retroactively or override existing law. The Court also tries to avoid an interpretation that would raise serious doubts about a statute's constitutionality.
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution vests all federal legislative power in Congress, while Article I, Section 7 sets forth the process for effectuating this power through passage of legislation by both houses and either presidential approval or veto override. The exercise of the judicial power of the United States often requires that courts construe statutes so enacted to apply them in concrete cases and controversies. Judicial interpretation of a statute is authoritative in the matter before the court, and may guide courts in future cases. Beyond this, the methodologies and approaches taken by the courts in interpreting meaning also can help guide legislative drafters, legislators, implementing agencies, and private parties.1
This report provides an overview of how the Supreme Court approaches statutory interpretation, with particular emphasis on rules and conventions that focus on the text itself.2 That is, to inform Congress on how the Court might go about analyzing the meaning of particular legislative language, this report emphasizes "textualist"-based means of interpretation. "Textualism" considers the "law" to be embodied in the language of the statute, construed according to its "plain meaning," which can be discerned through the aid, as necessary, of various judicially developed rules of interpretation.3 As put by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in an oft-quoted aphorism: "We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."4 "Textualism," as captured in Justice Holmes' quote, eschews explanatory legislative materials, and inferences drawn from them and other extrinsic sources, in applying statutory language to particular circumstances.
Despite its currency in recent decades, "textualism" is not the exclusive means of statutory analysis, and this report also briefly discusses "intentionalist"-based means of interpretation and the Court's approach toward relying on legislative history and other extrinsic considerations. This report is not intended as an examination of all schools of judicial decision making, or as an analysis of the merits or limits of the many methodologies used by courts in applying statutes in specific cases.5 In this regard, even though textualism may be the primary approach toward interpreting statutes, individual Supreme Court opinions often employ multiple types of statutory analysis to support their conclusions and critique majority/dissenting opinions with which they do not agree.6 Moreover, as general approaches for inferring meaning, neither textualism nor intentionalism is rigidly mechanistic or limited to the action of the enacting Congress, with "textualists," for example, sometimes looking to broader legal contexts and "intentionalists" at times venturing beyond the enacting Congress's particular intent to preserve a statute's purposes.7
When reading statutory text, the Supreme Court uses content-neutral canons developed by the judiciary that focus on word usage, grammar, syntax and the like. Sometimes, the Court also brings to bear various presumptions that reflect broader judicial concerns and can more directly favor particular substantive results. Other conventions assist the Court in determining whether to go beyond the corners of a statute and judicial-based rules of interpretation to also consider the congressional deliberations that led to a statute's passage. Although there is some overlap and inconsistency among these rules and conventions, and although the Court's pathway through the mix is often not clearly foreseeable, an understanding of interpretational possibilities may nonetheless aid Congress in choosing among various drafting options. To this end, the Court has expressed an interest "that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts."8 041b061a72